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Abstract
A sample of 11885 wage agreements, reached in the Canadian unionized sector during 1976-
2000, a period of high as well as exceptionally low inflation and substantial fluctuations in
nominal and real uncertainty, is used to study the determinants of key provisions of contracts
such as their duration and indexation clauses. Econometric techniques, which account for the
interaction between duration and indexation, as well as the latent nature of the elasticity of
indexation are used. Results obtained suggest that expected inflation, nominal and real
uncertainty account for most of the secular and cyclical changes in contract provisions.
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While inﬂation was relatively high during the 1970s and 1980s, a number of
theoretical and empirical studies examined the determinants of key features
of collective bargaining agreements, such as contract duration and cost-of-
living-allowance (COLA) clauses. These studies identiﬁed a number of im-
portant forces that aﬀect these variables. To begin with, contract duration
and indexation are determined simultaneously, sometimes in theoretical con-
texts that involve bargaining. Both variables are inﬂuenced by probability
beliefs about future values of relevant variables. Prominent among these
variables are price inﬂation and real shocks. Also critical are the parties’
attitudes to risk, their relative bargaining strength, circumstances unique to
the ﬁrm and the union (product and local labour market conditions and how
net incomes from other sources might be aﬀected by the state of nature), and
the cost of negotiation generally.
The duration of wage contracts and their indexation provisions are impor-
tant variables, not only because they are the outcomes of optimising actions
by labour market agents, but also because they aﬀect the dynamic response
of the macro economy to various shocks. Extant theoretical treatments of
these contractual provisions are complex and extensive,1 but the method-
ological approaches used lead to diﬀerent predictions regarding the role of
uncertainty. Gray’s (1976, 1978) macroeconomic work suggests that real and
nominal uncertainty should shorten contract duration and that their relative
1See Shavell (1976), Gray (1976, 1978), Azariadis (1978), Canzoneri (1980), Dye (1985),
Card (1986), Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983, 1984), Danziger (1988), Murphy (1992),
and Barcena-Ruiz and Campo (2000).
1signiﬁcance will determine the optimal degree of indexation - it will be less
than unity if real shocks are present. Shavell (1976) and Ehrenberg, Danziger
and San (1983, 1984) shift the focus to the microeconomic level and to eﬃ-
cient risk-sharing; Danziger (1988) uses the implicit-contracts approach. De-
pending on the value of parameters, these microeconomic approaches suggest
that real and nominal uncertainty can have a variety of eﬀects on contract
duration and indexation. Since no central planner imposes Gray’s optimal-
ity criterion, the relevance of her work for pair-speciﬁco u t c o m e si nN o r t h
America is unclear. Restricting attention to the microeconomic approaches
reduces the richness of eﬀects that empirical work might seek, but does not
remove the inherent ambiguities. A role remains for inductive work which,
by establishing the qualitative role of variables, may provide information on
parameters and guide future theoretical endeavours.
At the empirical level, a number of issues remain unresolved or unexplored
and hence the dialogue between theory and empirical evidence remains in-
complete.2 Studies of the role of nominal uncertainty by Christoﬁdes and
Wilton (1983), Christoﬁdes (1990), Murphy (1992, 2000), Rich and Tracy
(2000), and Vroman (1989), suggest that nominal uncertainty reduces con-
tract duration, while those by Bils (1990) and Wallace and Blanco (1991) re-
port no eﬀect. Real uncertainty has not been studied as extensively: Murphy
(2000) concludes that aggregate real uncertainty lengthens contracts, Kanago
(1998) reports a negative, signiﬁcant, eﬀect on contract duration from rela-
2Referring to their extensive attempt to check the eﬃcient risk-sharing model against
the data, Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1984, p. 242) conclude that ‘... the results ...
were ... mixed and did not provide strong support for the models.’
2tive uncertainty, and Rich and Tracy (2000) suggest that aggregate supply
(i.e. real) uncertainty reduces contract duration. Research concerning the
role of uncertainty on indexation is less voluminous and not as recent. Ehren-
berg, Danziger and San (1983, 1984) ﬁnd that real (industry) shocks aﬀect
positively the incidence and intensity of COLA clauses but have a statisti-
cally weaker, positive, eﬀect on contract duration. They note that inﬂation
uncertainty has a statistically signiﬁcant, positive, eﬀect only on the intensity
of indexation. The more recent US study by Rich and Tracy (2000) deals
with whether COLA clauses are chosen at all, rather than their strength. It
reports no signiﬁcant eﬀect of uncertainty on COLA incidence but all types
of uncertainty reduce contract duration. Another recent study by Murphy
(2000) concludes that inﬂation uncertainty reduces contract length but does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability that a COLA clause will be included
in a contract. Thus, considerable diversity exists in the empirical literature
concerning the role of nominal and real uncertainty. Mixed ﬁndings are also
reported about the expected inﬂation rate itself, a variable whose theoretical
role has been discussed at length. Gray (1978, note 3, p. 3) and Ehrenberg,
Danziger and San (1984, Table 1, row 7) argue that fully anticipated inﬂa-
tion should have no eﬀect on indexation. A role for expected inﬂation can
be generated in more complex models (Ehrenberg, Danziger and San, 1984,
pp. 224-225) and most empirical studies control for this variable.
To some extent, the empirical ambiguities persist because, with the de-
cline of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e1 9 9 0 s ,r e s e a r c ho nf e a tures of labour contracts gener-
ally and indexation in particular has practically ceased. Yet, this new regime
of low inﬂation oﬀers a rich context within which to study labour market ar-
3rangements. While the secular trend in inﬂation has been downward, the
r e d u c t i o ni ni n ﬂation was, at times, very abrupt, generating considerable
nominal uncertainty. In Canada, for instance, the All Items CPI inﬂation
rate was 10.9% in 1982 and 5.7% in 1983 and it declined further from 5.6%
in 1991 to 1.5% in 1992. As seen below, the implied increase in nominal
uncertainty was considerable. A similar argument holds for real uncertainty.
The Canada-wide unemployment rate increased from 7.6% in 1981 to 11% in
1982 and from 8.1% in 1990 to 10.4% in 1991. The regional eﬀects of these
recessions are even more pronounced. Depending on how real uncertainty is
measured,3 the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s involved substantial
increases in real uncertainty. In combination with the secular inﬂation con-
text and other relevant variables, changes in nominal and real uncertainty
should help researchers identify the forces that operate on labour contracts.
Over the period 1977-2000,4 the duration of Canadian wage contracts has
doubled. Changes in indexation arrangements have also been substantial -
see Figure 1 below. It is natural to wonder whether secular and cyclical
changes in contract duration and indexation provisions are related to nom-
inal and real shocks. This is all the more likely given that many of the
variables mentioned in the ﬁrst paragraph as determinants of contractual
arrangements are agent-speciﬁc and, possibly, time-invariant - e.g. risk aver-
sion. The Canadian experience of the last three decades provides a unique
opportunity to study the relation between these variables. A larger sample
3Murphy’s (2000) real uncertainty variable is based on the unemployment rate and
unusually large unemployment rates would be associated with larger real shocks.
4The data set used includes information from 1976-2000. However, ﬁrst contracts
cannot be used and observations from 1976 are lost - see section 4.1.
4of contracts than the seminal US studies have relied on, drawn from a longer
and richer historical context (1976-2000) than has hitherto been possible,
can be used. Attention is directed at contract duration and the elasticity of
indexation, using techniques which make it possible to take their interdepen-
dence into account as well as to address the distinction between the incidence
and intensity of indexation. Time series techniques are used, in a consistent
fashion, to model expected inﬂation as well as nominal and real uncertainty.
The results indicate that changes in these variables are largely responsible
for the historical evolution of these contractual arrangements.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
selected aspects of previous theoretical and empirical work on the subjects of
contract duration and indexation. Section 3 lays out the econometric model
used. Section 4 discusses the contract data as well as information that has
been appended. This includes a description of measures of expected inﬂation
as well as nominal and real uncertainty. Section 5 discusses the empirical
results, paying particular attention to the role of expected inﬂation, nominal
and real uncertainty. Section 6 oﬀers concluding observations and suggestions
for further work.
2S o m e P r e v i o u s L i t e r a t u r e
In this section, attention is focussed on four critical aspects of the empirical
work in this paper with the view to placing the empirical strategy in context,
rather than providing an exhaustive survey of earlier work. These aspects
concern (i) the generation of measures of expected inﬂation, nominal and
5real uncertainty, (ii) the distinction between the incidence and intensity of
indexation, (iii) the treatment of the interaction between contract duration
and indexation, and (iv) the related role of nominal wage adjustment in the
model adopted.
A critical aspect of empirical work in this area is the construction of mea-
sures of expected inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty. One approach used by
a number of authors is to specify a single equation describing inﬂation which
is estimated repeatedly, beginning well-before the period studied and ending
at the start of the period of interest. Observations are added as one rolls
forward through time. At each point during the period studied, the condi-
tional mean provides estimates of expected inﬂation and the standard error
of estimate, or its squared value, provides a measure of inﬂation uncertainty.5
A second approach is based on Engle’s (1982, 1983) ARCH or Bollerslev’s
(1986) Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH)
alternatives to the rolling regression method. These rely on a series’ mem-
ory and lags, rather than additional regressors, to achieve high descriptive
accuracy. While an ARCH model has been used in studies of contract provi-
sions, GARCH models have not.6 In this paper, GARCH techniques are used
5See Christoﬁdes and Wilton (1983), Christoﬁdes (1985, 1990), Wallace and Blanco
(1991) and Wallace (2001), for variations along this theme. Rich and Tracy (2000) ar-
gue that, for the US, this measure does not perform as well as their alternative survey-
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and structural vector autoregres-
sive (SVAR) measures.
6Rich and Tracy (2000) use an ARCH model based on survey data to construct a mea-
sure of inﬂation uncertainty. They also use Gali’s (1992) SVAR method, in combination
with a rolling window as in Friedman and Kuttner (1996), to construct time-varying mea-
sures of nominal and real uncertainty. The relation of these to inﬂation uncertainy is an
6to generate expected inﬂation and nominal uncertainty. A similar process is
used to generate real uncertainty based on deviations of real GDP from trend
- see section 4.3 and Appendix 1. A third approach to generating inﬂation
uncertainty relies on survey measures either directly, as in Vroman (1989)
and Kanago (1998), or indirectly, as in Rich, Raymond and Butler (1992),
to construct needed proxies. However, survey measures are not available for
Canada.
It is well known that most contracts contain no COLA clause and that,
where one exists, the elasticity of indexation is modest - see Table 1. Thus
two conceptually distinct issues, the incidence and the intensity of indexation,
need to be considered. Typically, limited dependent variable techniques are
used to study the former,7 but very few studies8 have studied the latter.
One approach which combines the study of the incidence and intensity of
indexation is the Tobit model which can speak to both issues, a point that
has not been exploited in the literature.9 T h eT o b i tm o d e li su s e di nt h i s
open question which is addressed in Rich, Raymond and Butler (1992).
7See, for example, Estenson (1981), Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983, 1984),
Cousineau, Lacroix and Bilodeau (1983), Hendricks and Kahn (1983, 1985), Ceccheti
(1987) and Bils (1990).
8Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983) use a Tobit model to study the elasticity of
indexation in 855 contracts. Card (1986) studies the marginal elasticity of indexation
in a truncated sample. Christoﬁdes (1990) examines the ex ante average elasticity of
indexation using a Tobit model, while Christoﬁdes and Stark (1996) consider the ex post
average elasticiy of indexation using truncated regression techniques.
9See, however, Christoﬁdes and Stark (1996). A related issue, which is not pursued
in this paper because of the wish to embed the study of indexation in a context where
duration is determined simultaneously, is the implied Tobit restriction that variables aﬀect
incidence and intensity with the same sign.
7paper.
In principle, all provisions of labour contracts (including those, such as
beneﬁt provisions, on which no information is provided in the contract data)
are subject to discussion and are determined during contract negotiations.10
It is, therefore, natural to think of contract duration and indexation as jointly
dependent and the theoretical treatments of Gray (1978) and Ehrenberg,
Danziger and San (1983, 1984) stress this point. Few studies of these contract
provisions have taken this issue on board.11 In this paper, we use Amemiya’s
(1979) model which considers both the jointness of contract duration and
indexation and the latent nature of indexation, thereby making it possible to
estimate a Tobit model. As noted, the latter can speak to both the incidence
and the intensity of indexation.
A ﬁnal issue that relates to the problems in the previous paragraph, is
the treatment of one variable on which information is available, namely non-
contingent nominal wage adjustment. It is a major, if not the main, item
during contract discussions and its relation to other features of contracts
must be considered. An approach that might be followed is that duration,
indexation and non-contingent wage adjustment must be modelled simulta-
neously. This task, allowing for a complete interaction among the variables
and addressing the incidence as well as the intensity issue, remains a chal-
lenge for this literature.12 Earlier Canadian work by Christoﬁdes (1990) and
10For an interesting paper along these lines see Azfar (2000).
11Murphy (2000) and Rich and Tracy (2000) deal with indexation incidence only, while
Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983, 1984) use single-equation methods.
12Christoﬁdes (1990) concludes, on econometric grounds, in favour of a causal structure,
where duration and indexation are determined separately from, but do in fact aﬀect, non-
8Christoﬁdes and Stark (1996) suggests that non-contingent adjustment is
aﬀected by but does not aﬀect duration and indexation.13 This structure
allows for duration and indexation to be considered on their own and it is
the approach adopted here.
3E c o n o m e t r i c S p e c i ﬁcation
Given this earlier literature, the duration and indexation equations should
be set up as a system, each variable inﬂuencing the other as well as being
subject to other forces. Duration is measured as a continuous variable and
indexation arrangements are captured by the variable Elasticity - see section
4 . 1 .D r o p p i n gt h et i m es u b s c r i p t st ,t h eb a s i cs y s t e ms p e c i ﬁed here is
Duration = Elasticity
∗ · γ1 + X1β1 + u1 (1)
Elasticity
∗ = Duration· γ2 + X2β2 + u2 (2)
where the actual value of the elasticity of indexation Elasticity is related
to its latent value Elasticity∗ by
contingent adjustment. Murphy (1992) considers the determination of contract duration,
noting that wage adjustment and indexation incidence are endogenous variables that must
be instrumented. Rich and Tracy (2000) do not consider non-contingent wage adjustment.
Finally, Murphy (2000) embeds a Probit, not a Tobit, model in a simultaneous structure
that determines, in addition, contract duration and wage adjustment.
13Note that the US work by Murphy (2000) also concludes that wage adjustment does
not aﬀect COLA incidence; it has a negative eﬀect, signiﬁcant at the 5% but not the 1%
level, on contract duration.
9Elasticity =
½




Equations (1)-(3) present a simultaneous equation system with one of
the endogenous variables, Elasticity∗, as a latent variable. Amemiya (1974
1979), Nelson and Olson (1977), and Heckman (1977) provide techniques for
estimating problems of this general nature. Amemiya (1979) reviews some
of these and provides the estimator used here. Write the system of equations
(1)-(3) in the form
Y1 = Y
∗
2 γ1 + X1β1 + u1 (4)
Y
∗
2 = Y1γ2 + X2β2 + u2, (5)
where Y1 is Duration and Y ∗
2 is Elasticity, both T × 1 vectors; the γi,i=
{1,2}, are scalars; the Xi are T × ki matrices of explanatory variables; the
βi are conformable ki × 1 vectors of constant coeﬃcients and the ui are
T×1 vectors of error terms with the usual simultaneous equations properties.
Write equations (4) and (5) in their reduced form
Y1 = Xπ1 + v1 (6)
Y
∗
2 = Xπ2 + v2, (7)
where X is T × k and πi is the k × 1 vector of reduced form coeﬃcients for
Yi. Substitute (6) and (7) into (4) and (5), to obtain
10π1 = π2γ1 + J1β1 (8)
π2 = π1γ2 + J2β2, (9)
where Ji,i st h ek × ki matrix consisting of zeros and ones in appropriate
positions such that XJi = Xi.L e t t i n gb πi be the OLS estimator of πi, write
equation (8) as
b π1 = b π2γ1 + J1β1 +(b π1 − π1) − (b π2 − π2)γ1 = b Hα1 + η1, (10)
where b H =( b π2,J 1) is a k×(1+k1) matrix of observables, α1 is the (1+k1)×1








and η1 =( b π1−π1)−(b π2−π2)γ1
is an error term.
OLS and GLS estimators of α1 based on equation (10) are
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11In order to implement these estimators, note that V0 is the asymptotic vari-
ance covariance matrix of b π2, an estimate of which can be obtained from
equation (7), c = σ2
1 − 2γ2
1σ12 and ˆ γ1 = b π1i/b π2i,w h e r eb π1i is the coeﬃcient
in equation (6) on any variable i that appears in X2 but not in X1 and b π2i
is the coeﬃcient on this same variable in the reduced form equation for Y ∗
2 .
Further needed estimators are b σ
2
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t ), where b v1t is the tth element in the vector of OLS
residuals from equation (6) and ˆ Ft = F(x
0
tb π2), where F is the cumulative
normal distribution evaluated at ˆ Y2t = x
0









can be obtained in a similar way. Although the GLS estimator is more com-
plex than the OLS one, it is more eﬃcient and is the approach adopted here.
The reduced form equations (6) and (7) are provided for completeness. In
addition, results from 2SLS, which ignore the latent nature of the elasticity
variable but account for simultaneity, and OLS (duration) or Tobit (indexa-
tion), which, in addition to ignoring the latent nature of Elasticity also ignore
simultaneity, are presented. These provide a useful sensitivity analysis. The
construction and theoretical role of the variables Y1,Y 2, and X are discussed
in the next section.
4 Data and Sources
4.1 The HRDC Data Base
The contract data used for this study is constructed from electronic records
provided by Human Resource Development Canada (HRDC) in Ottawa.
Each of the observations represents a legally binding agreement between an
12employer and a bargaining unit and documents many of the provisions of
the contract. The data base contains 11885 bargaining agreements reached
during the period 1976 through 2000. In order to take into account lagged
eﬀects, only observations where at least one prior agreement has been negoti-
ated are considered, leaving 9646 observations for 1977-2000. For these, any
variable available for the current contract is also available for the previous
contract and is indicated by a p preﬁx.
The HRDC data contain information on a number of variables, includ-
ing the main variables under study. Duration is deﬁned by HRDC as the
diﬀerence between the expiry date and the eﬀective date of the contract.14
Descriptive statistics on the variables used are presented in Table 1 - see
also Appendix 3. Duration is shown to have a mean of 25.629 months with
a standard deviation of 11.499 months. The COLA provisions in contracts
are diverse and complex15 but they generally describe how the base wage
rate should change as some price index evolves. The variable, Elasticity, is
deﬁned as the ex post percentage change in the base wage rate brought about
by the COLA clause in the contract divided by the percentage change in the
CPI over the life of the contract - see section 4.3. As indicated below, the
GARCH mechanism, used to generate inﬂation expectations, is descriptively
accurate and supports using the ex post, rather than the ex ante,C O L Aw a g e
growth on perfect foresight grounds. When the agreement does not contain
a COLA clause, Elasticity is set equal to zero. As Table 1 shows, the uncon-
ditional mean value of Elasticity is 0.075 with a standard deviation of 0.257
14See Rich and Tracy (2000) for some of the issues involved in this deﬁnition.
15For a discussion of some of the issues involved, see Card (1983), Hendricks and Kahn
(1985) , Kaufman and Woglom (1986), and Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1984).
13while, conditional on Elasticity>0, this value for the 1256 contracts involved
is 0.579 with a standard deviation of 0.462. The related variable Cola is set
equal to unity when the contract contains a formal COLA clause, even when
it was not activated,16 and is equal to zero otherwise. Its mean value is 0.192,
indicating that less than 20% of the contracts contain a COLA clause.
Figure 1 shows Duration, Elasticity and Cola averaged over the contracts
that became eﬀective in each of the years 1977-2000.17 As can be seen, Dura-
tion increased secularly, more than doubling from its 18-month low in 1978
to its 38 month high in 1998. This ﬁgure also indicates a secular decline
in the incidence (Cola) and intensity (Elasticity) of indexation. The secular
trends were, in some instances, interrupted by fairly substantial reversals,
as, for example, during 1990-1991, when (i) Cola and Elasticity increased
dramatically and (ii) the continuous increase in duration (since 1982) was
reversed. There is a very evident link between the incidence and the inten-
sity of indexation. Interactions between Duration and the two indexation
variables are more subtle and require conditioning on other variables before
they can be discerned. It should be noted that previous-contract values of
Duration and Elasticity appear in their respective equations. These variables
help identiﬁcation and, in addition, capture pair-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects which
16There are 1854 contracts for which Cola=1 and, for these contracts, the mean value of
Elasticity is 0.393 with a standard deviation of 0.467. The mean for this group is lower than
that for the 1256 contracts, since the latter includes only contracts for which the indexation
trigger was exceeded and the COLA clause generated a positive wage adjustment.
17Note that only four contracts remain for 1977 and that, as these are all indexed,
the sample average for the Cola series is used (instead of unity) in order to preserve a
reasonable scale in Figure 1. Note, too, the diﬀerence between the left and the right scales
in Figure 1.
14are diﬃcult or impossible to measure - e.g. risk aversion patterns.
Another variable included in the HRDC data base is the nominal base
wage rate proﬁle in eﬀect during the contract. Given this, and price infor-
mation that can be appended (see section 4.3), it is possible to construct the
real wage proﬁle as well as the average nominal and real wage rates prevailing
over the contract. In this paper, previous contract wages, which are exoge-
nous to the current contract, are used and, as Table 1 shows, the nominal
base wage rate Pnomwage is, on average, $13.312 with a standard deviation
of $5.469 over the 9646 contracts. The previous real wage Prealwage has a
higher mean as it is deﬂa t e db yaC P Iw h i c hh a sab a s eo f1 0 0r a t h e rl a t e
in the sample (in 1992). Another variable in the data base is the number
of employees covered by the contract (Employee has a mean of 2138 with a
standard deviation of 4644).18 Prealwage and Lemployee proxy worker bar-
gaining power and may be expected to increase duration and indexation as
these outcomes would provide insurance against unforseen real shocks and in-
ﬂation respectively. The region (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario which is the omit-
ted category, Prairie, British Columbia, Territories, and multi-province) and
industry (Construction, Transportation, Communications, Utilities, Trade,
Education, Health, Services, Other and Manufacturing as the omitted cat-
egory) in which the ﬁrm is located (see Table 1) are included for a variety
of reasons. First, labour demand and supply elasticities, which might be
expected to vary by region and industry, ﬁgure prominently in theoretical
18The natural logarithm of this variable, Lemployee, is used in the empirical work below.
Similar results were obtained using Plemployee because the number of employees across
contracts evolves very slowly. These results are available on request.
15treatments. In addition, these dummy variables condition on unobservables
that might inﬂuence bargaining between pairs. Finally, to the extent that
these variables are important statistically, their inclusion permits a clearer
statistical deﬁnition of the role of primary regressors.
4.2 Other Variables
Since the eﬀective and expiry dates of each contract are known, it is possi-
ble to append further variables to the information for each contract. Among
these, the Consumer Price Index (the All Items Index from Statistics Canada,
series 100000) is the most important. It allows calculation of Prealwage
above, as well as the inﬂation rate over various points in the contract. In
turn, the latter can be used, in the context of GARCH procedures, to gen-
erate the expected inﬂation rate over the life of the contract (Einf) and
the associated, time dependent, variance of inﬂation (Sinfvar), or nominal
uncertainty. Similar procedures can be applied to deviations of real GDP
from a linear trend to generate the variance proﬁle in the GARCH process
which is used as an indicator of real uncertainty (Sgdpvar).19 As indicated in
paragraph three, the expected inﬂation rate has a role to play in some risk-
sharing speciﬁcations. There is also evidence in Christoﬁdes and Laporte
(2002) that, in the presence of menu costs, higher expected inﬂation leads
to more frequent nominal, non-contingent, wage adjustments. The reason is
that without more frequent adjustments real wage rates will ﬂuctuate unduly,
imposing costs on the bargaining pair. One response is to shorten contract
19This real uncertainty variable corresponds more closely to real shocks in the real
business cycle literature than is the case with measures based on the unemployment rate.
16duration and another is more indexation. Thus Einf should aﬀect duration
negatively and indexation positively. The role of uncertainty in the literature
was discussed in sections 1 and 2. Unless the Danziger (1988) eﬀect domi-
nates, real uncertainty should reduce Duration. Note that productivity-based
real uncertainty has an ambiguous eﬀect on the degree of indexation - see
Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1984, Table 1, row 9). Inﬂation uncertainty
should have a positive coeﬃcient in the Elasticity equation.
Another important, dated, variable that has been attached is the indicator
of the state of the regional labour market within which the bargaining parties
are located. The variable used is the regional unemployment rate, Urate,
prevailing at the time the contract became eﬀective. These rates range cross-
sectionally as well as across time. For instance, in 1988, the unemployment
rate was 5.0% in Ontario and 12.4% in the Atlantic region; the variation over
time is exempliﬁed by the increase in Ontario’s unemployment rate to 10.9%
in 1992. Higher unemployment weakens the bargaining power of workers as
well as the ability of ﬁrms to improve contractual arrangements since it may
weaken the demand for its product. It is likely to lead to shorter contracts
and to weaken indexation provisions.
4.3 The Garch Processes
Following extensive testing downward from more general models, an AR(6)
regression model with a GARCH(1,1) error process yt = γ0 + γ1yt−1 +
γ2yt−2 + γ3yt−3 + γ4yt−4 + γ5yt−5 + γ6yt−6 + εt, where εt|Ψt−1 ∼ N (0,h t)
and ht = ω + αε2
t−1 + βht−1, was used to describe y = {π,gdp},w h e r et h e
inﬂation rate πt =1 0 0l n ( CPIt/CPIt−4) and the variable gdpt is deﬁned as
17the deviation of real GDP from a linear trend; note that real GDP is Cansim
series D15721.20 The implied error variance ht is time dependent and proxies
nominal and real uncertainty when derived from the π and gdp and equa-
tions, respectively. Figure 2 shows the actual and predicted values of πt and
Figure 3 shows the actual and predicted values of gdp over the period 1977-
2000Q3. The ﬁt of the two models is good (see Appendix 1) and the implied
nominal and real uncertainty variables are plotted in Figure 4. As can be
seen by comparing Figures 2 and 4, the general trend in πt is downward with
substantial declines in the early 1980s and 1990s. During these periods of
substantially reduced inﬂation, nominal uncertainty increased dramatically.
In Figure 3, the deviation of real GDP from trend naturally hovers around
zero but real uncertainty, in Figure 4, jumped dramatically during the reces-
sions of the early 1980s and 1990s. These dramatic swings in nominal and
real uncertainty can be expected to impact the incidence and intensity of
indexation and contract duration. As a by-product of GARCH estimation, it
is possible to forecast πt one quarter ahead (Einf). Similar procedures were
used for Sinfvar and Sgdpvar. These variables were assigned to each contract
according to its eﬀective date.
20Quarterly data availalble over 1946Q1-2000Q3 (1992=100) were used for the inﬂa-
tion process, while data available over 1961Q1-2000Q3 (1992=100) were used for the real
GDP process. In a benchmark study, Crawford and Kasumovich (1996) review diﬀerent
ARCH/GARCH models for the Canadian CPI inﬂation series; their results show that a
relatively simple ﬁxed parameter GARCH model, such as the one used here, can capture
the characteristics of Canadian inﬂation well.
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5.1 General Findings from Single Equations
Tables 2 and 3 present results for contract duration and indexation respec-
tively. In general, the results conform with the expectations in the literature
and, considering the cross-sectional nature of the data, the goodness of ﬁt
is satisfactory. In this sub-section, the single-equation estimates in column
1, Tables 2 and 3, are considered; simultaneity issues are examined in sub-
section 5.2. Column 1, Table 2, indicates OLS estimates of the structural
duration equation, where Elasticity21 replaces the latent variable in equation
(1). The coeﬃcient on Elasticity is 3.624 and signiﬁcant,22 suggesting that a
fully indexed contract would have duration which is longer than an unindexed
contract by nearly four months. There is substantial correlation through time
in contract duration as well as signiﬁcant industry and regional eﬀects. The
negative signs on the industry coeﬃcients indicate that the longest contracts
are to be found in manufacturing, the omitted class, while the shortest ones
are in education. The Atlantic provinces have the longest contracts, longer
than the omitted class (Ontario) by 5.576 months. The previous real wage
and the logarithm of the number of employees are not signiﬁcant. The re-
gional unemployment rate has the expected negative sign and is signiﬁcant.
The expected inﬂation and uncertainty variables all have negative, statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, coeﬃcients which are quantitatively important. Discussion
of the importance of these variables is deferred to section 5.3.
21That is, the OLS method does not take note of the latent nature of the elasticity
variable in equation (1).
22Unless otherwise stated, two-tailed hypothesis tests are conducted at the 5% level.
19Table 3 presents a set of estimates for the elasticity of indexation. Col-
umn 1 reports a structural Tobit equation. The ﬁto ft h i se q u a t i o ni ss a t -
isfactory. The interaction between the elasticity of indexation and contract
duration, evident in the duration equation, is also present in the Tobit equa-
tion of Column 1, Table 3, as is the temporal dependence of indexation on
its previous-contract value. It should be stressed that, with the exception
of Christoﬁdes (1990), no other study attempts to capture the interaction
between Duration and Elasticity - for a more extensive discussion of simul-
taneity, see section 5.2. Signiﬁcant industry and regional eﬀects are present
here as in the duration equation: the most heavily indexed contracts are
in manufacturing and in Quebec. Unlike the results in the duration equa-
tion, the previous real wage has a role to play and bargaining units involving
more employees have contracts which are indexed more heavily. The regional
unemployment rate has a coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcantly negative. The ex-
pected inﬂation and real uncertainty variables have signiﬁcant, positive and
negative respectively, coeﬃcients. However, the nominal uncertainty variable
has the expected, positive, coeﬃcient but it is not signiﬁcant. The role of
the expected inﬂation and uncertainty variables is examined in section 5.3.
Column 1, Table 4, repeats the Tobit coeﬃcients γ2 and β (column 1,
Table 3) and presents the marginal eﬀects F(¯ z) · coefficient,a n dt h eM c -
Donald and Moﬃtt (1980) decomposition of the marginal eﬀects into the im-
pact of a variable change on (i) the Elasticity above zero, ∂Elasticity∗/∂xi,
weighted by the probability, F(¯ z), of being above zero (this is denoted in
T a b l e4a st h eI n t e n s i t yE ﬀect) and on (ii) the probability of being above
the limit, ∂F(¯ z)/∂xi, weighted by the expected value of the latent elastic-
20ity E(Elasticity∗) ( t h i si sd e n o t e di nT a b l e4a st h eI n c i d e n c eE ﬀect). The
variable ¯ z is the standardised mean value of the argument. The ﬁgures in
columns 3 and 4, Table 4, add up to the complete marginal eﬀect in column
2, Table 4. Columns 5 and 6, Table 4, give ∂Elasticity∗/∂xi (the Elastic-
ity* Eﬀect) and ∂F(¯ z)/∂xi (the Probability Eﬀect) respectively.23 Table 4
reminds the reader that, relative to the coeﬃcients, the marginal eﬀects are
muted. Another point of interest in these calculations is that while the Elas-
ticity and Probability Eﬀects are relatively close in size, their weights in the
McDonald and Moﬃtt (1980) decomposition are not. Since the probabil-
ity of indexation is considerably lower than the conditional expectation, i.e.
F(¯ z) <E (Elasticity∗), the impact of changes in variables on the weighted
probability of indexation (column 4, Table 4) is larger than their weighted
impact on the degree of indexation (column 3, Table 4). For instance, Pelas-
ticity, the variable with the largest marginal eﬀect of 0.0966, has an Incidence
Eﬀect of 0.0815 and an Intensity Eﬀect of 0.0151.
5.2 Simultaneity
T h es i n g l ee q u a t i o nr e s u l t sa b o v ei n d i c a t et h a tt h et h e o r e t i c a li n t e r a c t i o n s
between contract duration and indexation are strongly evident in the data. It
is, therefore, important to check how the qualitative and quantitative results
in the structural equations change once simultaneity is taken into account.
T h e2 S L Sr e s u l t sa c c o u n tf o rs i m u l t a n e i t yb u tn o tt h el a t e n tn a t u r eo ft h e
index variable, while the Amemiya (1979) method addresses both problems.
23Note that F(¯ z)=0 .08,f (¯ z)=0 .1487,E (Elasticity)=0 .0272 and E(Elasticity∗)=
0.3396.
21Looking at contract duration in Table 2 ﬁrst, the coeﬃcient on the elasticity
variable under OLS is bracketed by those for Amemiya (1979) and 2SLS. In
the most appropriately estimated Amemiya (1979) speciﬁcation, the eﬀect
of full, relative to no indexation, is almost halved, suggesting that estimates
of the structural equation for duration that do not account for simultaneity
and the latent variable problem, or (as in 2SLS) account only for the former,
overestimate substantially the eﬀe c to fi n d e x a t i o no nd u r a t i o n .O t h e rc o e f -
ﬁcient estimates are very similar and hypothesis tests are not aﬀected across
estimation methods.
The structural equations for indexation, in Table 3, are somewhat more
sensitive to how simultaneity is taken into account than is the case in the
duration equation. In general, the OLS coeﬃcient estimates and hypothesis
test results are similar to those implied by the Amemiya (1979) method. The
2SLS coeﬃcient estimates are often smaller in size but it must be remem-
bered that 2SLS does not account for the latent nature of the elasticity of
indexation; the marginal eﬀects for Tobit, in Table 4, are similar in units to
the 2SLS ones in Table 3. A notable result concerns the nominal uncertainty
variable, which is not signiﬁcant in the OLS and Amemiya equations but
is signiﬁcant, with the expected sign, in the 2SLS results. McDonald and
Moﬃtt (1980) decompositions for the Amemiya (1979) estimates, similar to
those for Tobit results in column 1, Table 4, are very close to those reported
i nT a b l e4a n da r ea v a i l a b l ei nT a b l eA 1 ,A p p e n d i x2 .
The reduced form equations used in the Amemiya (1979) estimator are
of interest in their own right and appear in column 2, Tables 2 and 3. They
show duration and indexation (the latter is estimated as a Tobit) net of the
22interactions between the two variables. These equations conﬁr mt h er o l eo f
the regressors discussed above. Figures 5 and 6 summarise the predictions
of the reduced form equations for duration and indexation in Tables 2 and
3 respectively. In the case of indexation, Figure 6 plots the unconditional
expected values E(Elasticity)=F(z)[Duration·γ2 +X2β2]+σf(z), where
z =[ Duration · γ2 + X2β2]/σ and σ is the standard deviation of u2.24 The
predicted values in Figures 5 and 6 track the actual observations well25 and
are discussed in detail in section 5.3.
In summary, the interaction between contract duration and indexation,
which is so important in the theoretical literature, is clearly evident in the
estimates presented above. Contract duration is longer when contracts are
more heavily indexed and the degree of indexation, in turn, is likely to be
greater in long rather than short contracts. When the most appropriate,
Amemiya (1979), estimation method is used, the structural equation for the
elasticity of indexation is nevertheless similar to the OLS one. However,
the structural duration equation entails a coeﬃcient for indexation which is
grossly exaggerated when simultaneity and the latent nature of the elasticity
variable are ignored. The reduced form equations provide predictions which
track the actual observations for duration, the unconditional elasticity of
24The model can be used to also predict, using F(¯ z), the probability of indexation. A
comparison of this against a dummy variable indicating whether Elasticity > 0,i n d i c a t e s
that the Tobit equation performs well - see Appendix 2, Figure A1. Note that the variable
Cola, deﬁned in section 4.1, would lie uniformly above the lines in Figure A1 because of
the number of contracts containing COLA clauses which were not activated.
25Predictions are made at the individual contract level and are averaged across all con-
tracts that have eﬀective dates in particular years.
23indexation and indexation incidence well.
5.3 Role of Expected Inﬂation and Uncertainty
As already noted, Figures 5 and 6 summarise the predictions of the Amemiya
(1979) model for duration and indexation respectively. Since the variables of
particular interest in this study, namely expected inﬂation (Einf), nominal
(Sinfvar), and real (Sgdpvar) uncertainty are time-dependent, their inﬂuence
and that of other time-dependent variables, can be seen in these ﬁgures. In
Figure 5, the predictions track the actual data very well, capturing both the
secular increase and the turning points of the early 1980s and 1990s. The
secular increase in the predicted values must be due to the right combination
of coeﬃcient sign and regressor behaviour through time and the best expla-
nation involves expected inﬂation.26 The ﬁv e - y e a ra v e r a g ef o rE i n fw a sl o w e r
by 7.72 percentage points at the end of the sample than at the beginning and,
multiplied by the coeﬃcient of -0.967, this produces a predicted increase in
contract duration of about 7.46 months over the sample period. Allowing
for the long-run ampliﬁcation of this eﬀect (because of the lagged duration
variable) results in a predicted increase in duration of about 11.3 months,
26Prealwage and Lemployee trend upwards very gently and have positive coeﬃcients
which are too small to contribute importantly to the growth in predicted duration. The
unemployment rate as well as nominal and real uncertainty are mostly cyclical and hence
cannot contribute in a major way to the explanation of the secular increase in duration.
It should be noted that the predicted values in Figure 5 reﬂect the industrial and regional
composition of settlements in any particular year. Thus, the discussion in terms of eﬀects
t h r o u g ht i m ei nt h i ss u b s e c t i o ns h o u l db et h o u g h to fa ss u p e r i m p o s e do na no t h e r w i s e
neutral cross-sectional pattern of settlements.
24the approximate amount shown for the actual data in Figure 5.
While the decline in expected inﬂation appears to be the best single ex-
planation for the secular increase in contract duration, other time-dependent
variables contribute valuable detail to the predicted values of Figure 5. For
instance, the decline in the predicted duration of some ﬁve months between
1990 and 1992 cannot be explained by Einf which declined from 4.49% in
1990 to 2.95% in 1992. However, the substantial decline in actual inﬂation
during this period generated a sharp increase in nominal uncertainty from
0.18 to 0.56 (about 0.38). This, times the coeﬃcient on Sinfvar in the reduced
form equation for duration of -5.093, generates a decline in predicted dura-
tion of about two months. The recession also generated considerable real
uncertainty, leading to a rise in Sgdpvar from 9.47 to 16.57; this increase,
times the coeﬃcient on this variable of -0.198, contributes another month
to the predicted decline in contract duration. Also important during this
recession period, was the increase in the unemployment rate from 7.84% to
11.14%. Taking the coeﬃcient of -0.34 into account, this 3.3 percentage point
increase in Urate would contribute a decrease in predicted duration of about
one month. Between them, these short-run eﬀects reduce predicted duration
b yt h ea m o u n ts h o w ni nF i g u r e5 . T h eo t h e rn o t a b l ed e c l i n ei np r e d i c t e d
duration, which occurred between 1980 and 1982, was largely due to the
substantial increase in real uncertainty from 8.83 to 20.76. This increase ac-
counts (11.93×−0.198) for a 2.4 month decrease in contract duration. While
expected inﬂation and nominal uncertainty were reasonably ﬂat during this
period (see Figures 2 and 4), the average value of the regional unemployment
rate increased from 7.25% to 10.49% leading to a 1.1 month (3.24 × −0.34)
25decrease in predicted duration. Thus, the decline in contract duration dur-
ing the recession of the early 1980s was driven by real factors alone. The
tremendous increase in real uncertainty during 1998 (from 12.25 to 22.11)
was also responsible for the small dip in predicted duration in that year, a
f o r c ew h i c hw a sn o tr e ﬂected in the actual data.
Turning to the behaviour of Elasticity through time, Figure 6 indicates a
substantial secular decline which is largely the visual product of outliers in
1977.27 If 1978 is taken as the starting point, Elasticity declined continually
from 0.13 to 0.036 in 1998 before increasing to 0.19 in 1999 and falling back
to 0.068 in 2000. A number of secular factors, such as the growth over the
sample in Prealwage and Pduration, would suggest (given the positive coeﬃ-
cients of 0.009 and 0.013 respectively) changes in the wrong direction. Thus,
again, expected inﬂation, which declined from 8.26% in 1978 to 1.48% in
1998, is left as the only explanation for the secular decline in Elasticity.28 In
the case of the elasticity of indexation, the uncertainty variables have oppo-
site coeﬃcients so that the impact of the 1990-1992 increase in nominal and
real uncertainty tend to cancel out. There is a substantial decrease in Elas-
ticity between 1981 and 1982 which, again, is due to real factors alone. Real
uncertainty increased from 13.04 to 20.76 leading to a potential decline in
Elasticity of 0.11 points (7.72×−0.014) and the regional unemployment rate
jumped from 7.01% to 10.49% leading to a possible decrease in Elasticity of
27In 1977, there are only four observations and these happen to have the rather high
conditional elasticity of 0.22.
28Indeed, the predicted decline of 0.37 is considerably larger than what appears in the
predictions of Figure 6 because of the forces, seen earlier, which tended to increase the
elasticity of indexation.
260.15. During the early 1980s, nominal forces were not substantially at play.
The reader is reminded that the actual and predicted values in all ﬁgures
reﬂect the industrial and regional composition of the bargaining calendar, so
that some cross sectional variation will be superimposed on all the tempo-
ral calculations. Such variation appears to be responsible for the predicted
increase in Elasticity during 1980 and its decrease in 1995.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, a large number of Canadian wage contracts was used to anal-
yse important contract provisions such as their duration and elasticity of
indexation. The contracts were arrived at over the period 1976-2000, a pe-
riod of high, medium and exceptionally low inﬂation. During this period,
the inﬂation rate declined steadily but not smoothly. The recessions of the
early 1980s and 1990s generated not only substantial real but, also, sub-
stantial nominal uncertainty. This rich historical context, in combination
with the unique dataset assembled by federal authorities, makes it possible
to study contracts, using up-to-date time series analysis methods to gener-
ate conditioning variables and econometric techniques that account for both
simultaneity and the latent nature of the elasticity of indexation. Results
on the latter, can, subject to restrictions, be decomposed into eﬀects on the
incidence as well as the intensity of indexation. The results obtained gen-
erally accord with theory where deﬁnite conclusions are warranted and they
help guide future theoretical eﬀorts by supplying stylised facts - the results
for Canada are similar, where they can be compared, with those obtained
27by Rich and Tracy (2000) for the US. Thus pessimism expressed in earlier
work on the correspondence between theory and evidence may, perhaps, be
attributed to the short historical period and small number of contracts used
in older studies.
A very strong feature of theoretical work in this area is the interdepen-
dence between contract duration and indexation, a force which is very evident
i nt h ed a t a .I n d e x e dc o n t r a c t sa r em o r el i k e l yt ob el o n ga n dl o n gc o n t r a c t s
are more likely to be indexed. The quantitative measurement of these cross
eﬀects requires the use of techniques which account for both simultaneity
and the latent nature of the elasticity of indexation. These eﬀects are estab-
lished despite the inclusion in the equations of past duration and indexation
practices adopted by bargaining pairs. This previous-contract information
conditions for diﬃcult-to-measure ﬁxed pair eﬀects and helps clarify the role
of other regressors.
Of the variables that may proxy bargaining power, the most reliable is
the regional unemployment rate. Increases in this variable reduce contract
duration and indexation. Signiﬁcant regional and industry eﬀects suggest
that the longest and most indexed contracts are found in manufacturing and
in Quebec and Ontario.
Allowing that the patterns of behaviour in the annual averages plotted
in Figures 5 and 6 reﬂect the bargaining calendar, the model accounts for (i)
t h ed r a m a t i ci n c r e a s ei nc o n t r a c td u r a t i o na n dt h ed e c r e a s ei nt h ee l a s t i c -
ity of indexation over the period 1976-2000 and (ii) most of the noteworthy
short-run deviations in these variables from trend. As in Rich and Tracy
(2000), the expected inﬂa t i o nr a t e ,w h i c hd e c l i n e do v e rt h ep e r i o d ,i sas i g -
28niﬁcant negative force on duration and positive inﬂuence on indexation, thus
explaining the secular behaviour of both dependent variables. The nominal
uncertainty variable has the expected negative inﬂuence on duration and its
inﬂuence on indexation, though consistently positive, has statistical signiﬁ-
cance which depends on the estimation method adopted. Murphy’s (2000, p.
193) conjecture, that the correlation between measures of expected inﬂation
and nominal uncertainty may cloud the inﬂuence of each, was checked29 and
does not appear to account for this weakness. The real uncertainty variable
has a negative, signiﬁcant, coeﬃcient in both the duration and indexation
equations. The variation in the uncertainty variables, along with movements
in the regional unemployment rate, explain most of the notable short-run
ﬂuctuations in contract duration and indexation. In this sense, the hope
expressed in the introduction, that a rich historical context may help clarify
the role of important variables, may have been justiﬁed.
Regretably, the lack of data availability did not permit the use of expec-
tational data from surveys, but our results appear not to be sensitive to the
choice of regressors capturing the inﬂationary environment. An outstanding
challenge for this literature is the incorporation of other contractual provi-
sions into a fully simultaneous context. Finally, it would have been desirable
to draw on more explicit theoretical treatments of the role of expected in-
ﬂation in contractual arrangements. Existing theoretical literature tends to
d o w n p l a yt h er o l eo ft h i sv a r i a b l e .I ft h er e s u l t sh e r ea n di nR i c ha n dT r a c y
(2000) withstand scrutiny, an inductive challenge to theorists will have been
29When the expected inﬂation values attached to the 9646 observations were regressed
against the values for nominal uncertainty, the R2 obtained was 0.083.
29issued.
30Appendix 1: GARCH Processes
Following extensive LR and ARCH tests to determine the optimum lag
structure in the main and the error term equations respectively, the speci¯-
cations below were selected:
GARCH (1,1) Results for ¼t
R2 = 0.955




Variable Coe±cient std. dev t-statistic
°0 0.145530 0.071892 2.024282
°1 1.391829 0.010457 133.103751
°2 -0.241467 0.075508 -3.197900
°3 -0.114699 0.105339 -1.088856
°4 -0.466283 0.104141 -4.477396
°5 0.658432 0.095240 6.913366
°6 -0.259567 0.055737 -4.656993
! 0.020127 0.016180 1.243971
¯ 0.816233 0.078517 10.395657
® 0.132984 0.066642 1.995508
and
GARCH (1,1) Results for gdpt
R2 = 0.812




Variable Coe±cient std. dev. t-statistic
°0 0.111780 0.272105 0.410797
°1 1.188145 0.084186 14.113348
°2 -0.359293 0.134628 -2.668788
°3 0.209213 0.130434 1.603972
°4 -0.220799 0.125637 -1.757439
°5 -0.038757 0.118359 -0.327456
°6 0.045305 0.074749 0.606090
! 3.348482 3.102360 1.079334
¯ 0.486113 0.308306 1.576719
® 0.264855 0.135348 1.956850
32Appendix 2: Table A1, Figure A1
33Table A1












Intercept -2.2930 -0.1927 -0.0309 -0.1619 -0.3671 -0.4722
Duration 0.0280 0.0024 0.0004 0.002 0.0045 0.0058
Prealwage 0.0120 0.0010 0.0002 0.0008 0.0019 0.0025
Pelasticity 1.1950 0.1004 0.0161 0.0844 0.1913 0.2461
Natres -0.0090 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0019
Constr -0.4690 -0.0394 -0.0063 -0.0331 -0.0751 -0.0966
Transp -0.1270 -0.0107 -0.0017 -0.009 -0.0203 -0.0262
Commun -0.1150 -0.0097 -0.0015 -0.0081 -0.0184 -0.0237
Utils -0.1530 -0.0129 -0.0021 -0.0108 -0.0245 -0.0315
Trade -0.5180 -0.0435 -0.007 -0.0366 -0.0829 -0.1067
Educat -0.2500 -0.0210 -0.0034 -0.0176 -0.04 -0.0515
Health -0.3180 -0.0267 -0.0043 -0.0224 -0.0509 -0.0655
Service -0.4800 -0.0403 -0.0065 -0.0339 -0.0768 -0.0989
Others -0.3310 -0.0278 -0.0045 -0.0234 -0.053 -0.0682
Atlantic -0.0810 -0.0068 -0.0011 -0.0057 -0.013 -0.0167
Que 0.1160 0.0097 0.0016 0.0082 0.0186 0.0239
Prairie -0.0590 -0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0042 -0.0094 -0.0122
BC -0.2400 -0.0202 -0.0032 -0.0169 -0.0384 -0.0494
Terri 0.1130 0.0095 0.0015 0.008 0.0181 0.0233
Mprov -0.2230 -0.0187 -0.003 -0.0157 -0.0357 -0.0459
Lemployee 0.0730 0.0061 0.001 0.0052 0.0117 0.015
Urate -0.0350 -0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0056 -0.0072
Einf 0.0820 0.0069 0.0011 0.0058 0.0131 0.0169
Sinfvar 0.1770 0.0149 0.0024 0.0125 0.0283 0.0365








a F is the cumulative standard normal density function evaluated at z, where 
b f is the standard normal probability density function.
c Mean value of estimated unconditional elasticity, where E(Elasticity*) denotes the mean value of the conditional 
variable - see section 5.1.






















































































































































































)Appendix 3: Data Construction
The following variables are drawn from the HRDC database:
Duration: Di®erence between expiry and e®ective date (rounded to the
nearest whole month).
Cola: A dummy variable which equals 1 if the contract contains any one
of four COLA clause types and is equal to zero otherwise.
Elasticity: The percentage change of COLA wage adjustment divided by
the percentage change in the CPI, over the duration of the contract.
Pelasticity: Elasticity for the previous contract.
Prealwage: The nominal wage rate divided by the CPI at the end of
previous agreement.
Industry: Dummy variables generated using the Statistics Canada 1970
Standard Industrial Classi¯cation code.
Region: Atlantic refers to Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick; Prairie refers to Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Alberta: Territories refers to Yukon and North West Territories and multi-
province to contracts which apply to workplaces in a number of provinces.
Lemployee: The natural logarithm of the number of employees in the
bargaining unit.
Urate - Quarterly unemployment rate matched by province at settlement
date.
The following variables are generated from GARCH processes:
Einf: Expected in°ation generated, from a GARCH (1,1) process de-
scribing the in°ation rate. It is the average in°ation rate forecast one quarter
ahead. It is assignedaccordingto the e®ective date of the contract. Basedon
34the All Items Consumer Price Index (Statistics Canada P100000, 1992=100).
Sinfvar: In°ation uncertainty generated as the one quarter ahead fore-
cast of the conditional variance from a GARCH (1,1) process describing the
in°ation rate. It is assigned to each contract according to the e®ective date.
Sgdpvar: Real uncertainty generated as the one quarter ahead forecast of
the conditional variance from a GARCH (1,1) process describing the devia-
tion of real GDP (Statistics Canada D15721, billions of 1992 dollars) from
an estimated linear trend. It is assigned to each contract according to the
e®ective date.
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Variable Description Mean Std Dev
Duration contract length in months 25.629 11.499
Cola dummy variable: contract contains Cola 0.192 0.394
Elasticity elasticity of indexation 0.075 0.257
E| E>0 conditional elasticity of indexation 0.579 0.462
Pcola dummy variable: previous contract contains Cola 0.206 0.404
Pelasticity the intensity of indexation for previous contract 0.085 0.269
Pdur contract duration (previous contract) 23.892 9.906
Pnomwage nominal wage (previous contract) 13.308 5.470
Prealwage real wage (previous contract) 0.157 0.048
Natres dummy variable: natural resource 0.027 0.163
Manuf dummy variable: manufacturing
b 0.195 0.396
Constr dummy variable: construction 0.051 0.220
Transp dummy variable: transportation 0.082 0.274
Commun dummy variable: communication 0.036 0.186
Utils dummy variable: utility 0.028 0.165
Trade dummy variable: trade 0.042 0.200
Educat dummy variable: education 0.251 0.434
Health dummy variable: health care 0.085 0.278
Service dummy variable: service 0.032 0.176
Others dummy variable: other sector 0.171 0.377
Atlantic dummy variable: Atlantic region 0.071 0.257
Que dummy variable: Quebec 0.150 0.358
Ont dummy variable: Ontario
b 0.365 0.481
Prairie dummy variable: Prairie provinces 0.170 0.376
BC dummy variable: British Columbia 0.115 0.319
Terri dummy variable: Territories 0.005 0.069
Mprov dummy variable: muti-province contracts 0.124 0.330
Employee number of of employees covered by contract 2138.250 4644.470
Lemployee natural logarithm of employee 7.073 0.902
Urate quarterly regional unemployment rate 9.361 2.762
Einf expected inflation estimated from GARCH 4.446 3.053
Sinfvar nominal uncertainty 0.296 0.119
Sgdpvar real uncertainty 12.918 4.634
a Based on 9646 observations for which previous contract information is available. They are drawn from 
1977-2000. The original sample consists of 11885 constracts drawn from 1976-2000.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercept -1.9710 -0.1534 -0.0240 -0.1294 -0.3083 -0.3872
Duration 0.0200 0.0016 0.0002 0.0013 0.0031 0.0039
Prealwage 0.0120 0.0009 0.0001 0.0008 0.0019 0.0024
Pelasticity 1.2410 0.0966 0.0151 0.0815 0.1941 0.2438
Natres -0.0010 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002
Constr -0.4830 -0.0376 -0.0059 -0.0317 -0.0755 -0.0949
Transp -0.1580 -0.0123 -0.0019 -0.0104 -0.0247 -0.0310
Commun -0.1790 -0.0139 -0.0022 -0.0118 -0.0280 -0.0352
Utils -0.2120 -0.0165 -0.0026 -0.0139 -0.0332 -0.0416
Trade -0.5680 -0.0442 -0.0069 -0.0373 -0.0888 -0.1116
Educat -0.3420 -0.0266 -0.0042 -0.0225 -0.0535 -0.0672
Health -0.3860 -0.0300 -0.0047 -0.0253 -0.0604 -0.0758
Service -0.5170 -0.0402 -0.0063 -0.0340 -0.0809 -0.1016
Others -0.3970 -0.0309 -0.0048 -0.0261 -0.0621 -0.0780
Atlantic -0.0180 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0035
Que 0.1540 0.0120 0.0019 0.0101 0.0241 0.0302
Prairie -0.0550 -0.0043 -0.0007 -0.0036 -0.0086 -0.0108
BC -0.2220 -0.0173 -0.0027 -0.0146 -0.0347 -0.0436
Terri 0.1280 0.0100 0.0016 0.0084 0.0200 0.0251
Mprov -0.2100 -0.0163 -0.0026 -0.0138 -0.0328 -0.0412
Lemployee 0.0760 0.0059 0.0009 0.0050 0.0119 0.0149
Urate -0.0390 -0.0030 -0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0061 -0.0077
Einf 0.0720 0.0056 0.0009 0.0047 0.0113 0.0141
Sinfvar 0.0830 0.0065 0.0010 0.0055 0.0130 0.0163








a F is the cumulative standard normal density function evaluated at z, where 
b f is the standard normal probability density function.
c Mean value of estimated unconditional elasticity, where E(Elasticity*) denotes the mean value of the conditional 
variable - see section 5.1.
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